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Abstract
We study the quantum query complexity of finding a certificate for a d-regular, k-level
balanced nand formula. We show that the query complexity is Θ˜(d(k+1)/2) for 0-certificates,
and Θ˜(dk/2) for 1-certificates. In particular, this shows that the zero-error quantum query
complexity of evaluating such formulas is O˜(d(k+1)/2). Our lower bound relies on the fact that
the quantum adversary method obeys a direct sum theorem.
1 Introduction
Recently, there has been considerable progress in understanding the quantum query complexity of
evaluating Boolean formulas. Here, we consider the closely related problem of certifying the value
of a formula.
An n-bit Boolean formula φ corresponds to a rooted tree with n leaves, where each leaf represents
a binary variable xi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and each internal vertex represents a logic gate acting on
its children. We can evaluate φ on an input x ∈ {0, 1}n by applying the logic gates from the leaves
toward the root, giving some binary value φ(x) at the root. Suppose we are given a black box that,
on input i, produces the bit xi. The minimum number of queries to such a black box required to
learn φ(x) for an arbitrary x ∈ {0, 1}n is called the query complexity of evaluating φ.
In this article, we focus on the case of nand formulas, in which each internal vertex corresponds
to a nand gate. (Note that formulas consisting of and, or, and not gates are equivalent to nand
formulas.) Furthermore, we suppose that the tree is regular, with internal vertices of degree d, and
balanced, with a total of k levels. Thus, there are n = dk input variables.
To evaluate such a formula on a black-box input, a deterministic classical computer must make
all n queries. However, the expected number of queries for a randomized classical computer to
evaluate the formula with zero error is O(λkd) [16,18], where λd := (d−1+
√
d2 + 14d+ 1)/4, using
a simple recursive strategy. Indeed, this is the optimal query complexity not just for zero-error
algorithms [16], but also for bounded-error ones [17]. If we fix d and let k grow, this represents a
polynomial speedup over the deterministic strategy of evaluating all leaves, since only O(nlogd λd)
queries are required; for example, with d = 2, the classical query complexity is Θ(n0.753...). On the
other hand, if we fix k and let d grow, then the query complexity is essentially n.
For quantum computers, the situation is quite different. Grover’s algorithm shows that if k = 1,
so that d = n, a quantum computer can evaluate the formula with bounded error in O(
√
n) queries
[12], which is optimal [7]. Similar results can be obtained for constant k: a recursive strategy
with straightforward error reduction uses O(
√
n logk−1 n) queries [8], and a more delicate approach
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to error reduction uses O(
√
nαk) queries for some constant α [14]. In particular, this shows that
the quantum query complexity is O(
√
n) provided k is constant, and even gives some speedup for
sufficiently large constant d. However, for the case where d is a small constant, no better-than-
classical quantum algorithm was known for nearly ten years. A breakthrough occurred with the
revolutionary quantum walk approach of [11], which—combined with a simple observation on the
simulation of Hamiltonian dynamics by quantum circuits [10]—showed that
√
n1+o(1) queries suffice
for the case where d = 2. Subsequent work showed that in fact the quantum query complexity
is O(
√
n) for any d, k [4]. Since this is optimal [5], the quantum query complexity of evaluating
balanced nand formulas is now a closed problem.
Here, we consider the problem of determining a minimal certificate for the value of a nand
formula. A certificate for φ on input x ∈ {0, 1}n is a subset c ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that the values of
xi for i ∈ c determine φ(x). We say that a certificate c is minimal if no proper subset of c is also a
certificate.
We can view the size of the minimal certificate as a kind of nondeterministic query complexity,
since this is the number of queries required to verify the value of the formula if we can guess the
certificate. The certificate size of a regular, balanced nand formula can be understood simply, as
follows. Let Cb(k) denote the size of a minimal certificate for a k-level balanced nand formula
evaluating to b (a b-certificate). We have C0(0) = C1(0) = 1, and
C0(k) = dC1(k − 1) C1(k) = C0(k − 1). (1)
Solving this recursion, we obtain
C0(k) =
{
dk/2 k even
d(k+1)/2 k odd
C1(k) =
{
dk/2 k even
d(k−1)/2 k odd.
(2)
Thus, the certificate size is precisely
√
n for a formula with an even number of levels, and is close
to that value when the number of levels is large and odd. Note that a minimal 0-certificate is a set
of 0-inputs for k even and a set of 1-inputs for k odd; a minimal 1-certificate is a set of 1-inputs for
k even and a set of 0-inputs for k odd.
Given a regular, balanced nand formula and a black box for the input, we are interested in
the number of queries required to output a minimal certificate. This question is of interest for
several reasons. Whereas the optimal classical algorithm for evaluating a nand formula produces
a certificate in the course of its evaluation, the same does not hold for the known optimal quantum
algorithms, so it is natural to ask whether quantum computers have a comparable advantage for
certification as they do for evaluation. (The algorithm of [4] produces a quantum state that is
related to certificates, which suggests a potential approach to certificate finding, but it turns out
that a simpler strategy is nearly optimal.) In addition, the query complexity of certificate finding
gives an upper bound on the zero-error query complexity of the problem (as emphasized in [9]),
although it is not known if this bound is optimal in general.
Note that Aaronson introduced a notion of quantum certificate complexity [1], which is also
concerned with quantum algorithms for certifying the value of a function. However, our setting
is different: we study quantum algorithms which output classical certificates, while in Aaronson’s
work, the quantum algorithm itself is a certificate and no classically-verifiable certificate is provided.
For a constant number of levels k, the previous best quantum algorithm for producing a certifi-
cate for a nand formula uses O(d(k+2)/2) queries in the case of 0-certificates, and O(d(k+1)/2) in the
case of 1-certificates [9, Lemma 1]. We improve upon this, and also give a result for non-constant
k, as follows:
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Theorem 1. Fix k > 1 and consider a d-regular, k-level balanced nand formula φ with black-box
input x. The bounded-error and zero-error quantum query complexities of certifying (φ, x) are
O(k2d(k+1)/2) and Ω(d(k+1)/2) if φ(x) = 0 (3)
O(k2dk/2) and Ω(dk/2) if φ(x) = 1. (4)
In particular, the zero-error quantum query complexity of evaluating φ(x) is O(k2d(k+1)/2).
Note that for k = 1, the formula is simply a single nand gate, and the bounded-error query
complexity of certifying it on any input is Θ(
√
n).
The upper bound in Theorem 1 comes from a strategy that applies the formula evaluation
algorithm of [4] recursively, as described in Section 2. The lower bound appeals to direct sum
theorems. We discuss a direct sum theorem for adversary lower bounds in general in Section 3, and
apply it to certification in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5 by mentioning a few open questions.
2 Algorithm
To find a certificate for a nand formula, consider the following simple recursive strategy. First
evaluate the root using the O(
√
n)-query algorithm of [4]. If the result is 0, each child of the root
must evaluate to 1, and we can find a 1-certificate for each in turn. If the result is 1, then we search
for a child evaluating to 0 using Grover’s algorithm combined with formula evaluation, and then
find a 0-certificate for it.
This strategy gives a nearly optimal algorithm for certificate finding. However, we must be
careful when applying the formula evaluation algorithm recursively, since it only succeeds with
bounded error, and we must ensure that this error can be kept under control.
To find a b-certificate for a k-level tree, we can apply the procedure Ab(k), defined as follows.
Procedure A0(k).
• If k = 1, query every leaf. If they are all 1, then output every index; otherwise, go into an
infinite loop.
• If k > 1, run A1(k − 1) on each subtree.
Procedure A1(k).
• If k = 1, repeat Grover’s algorithm until a 0-leaf is found, verifying the result to ensure
one-sided error. When a 0-leaf is found, output its index.
• If k > 1, repeat the following until passing the verification:
– Perform robust quantum search [14] for a 0-subtree, using the nand tree evaluation
algorithm [4] as a subroutine. (Note that robust quantum search has two-sided error.)
Repeat the search until a 0-subtree T is found.
– Verify that T is a 0-subtree with error probability at most 1/n2 by running the nand
tree evaluation algorithm O(log n) times and taking a majority vote.
• Once T passes the verification, run A0(k − 1) on T .
A simple inductive argument shows that Ab(k) will never terminate when given a formula
evaluating to b¯. Furthermore, when Ab(k) does halt, it is guaranteed to return a correct b-certificate.
It remains to understand how long it takes for Ab(k) to produce a b-certificate.
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Lemma 2. Suppose that Ab(k) is given a d-regular, k-level balanced nand formula evaluating to b.
Assume that the verification step in procedure A1 never makes an error. Then the expected number
of queries before A0(k), A1(k) terminates is
O
(
k
(
1 + k log d√
d
)√
dk+1
)
, O
(
k
(
1 + k log d√
d
)√
dk
)
, (5)
respectively.
Proof. Let E[Ab(k)] denote the expected number of queries made by Ab(k) when given a formula
evaluating to b, assuming the procedure A1 never makes an erroneous verification. For k = 1, we
have E[A0(1)] = d and E[A1(1)] = O(
√
d). For k ≥ 2,
E[A1(k)] = O(d
k/2) +O(d(k−1)/2 log n) + E[A0(k − 1)] (6)
= O
((
1 + k log d√
d
)
dk/2
)
+ E[A0(k − 1)] (7)
and
E[A0(k)] = dE[A1(k − 1)]. (8)
Solving this recurrence gives
E[A1(k)] = O
(
k
(
1 + k log d√
d
)√
dk
)
(9)
and
E[A0(k)] = O
(
k
(
1 + k log d√
d
)√
dk+1
)
(10)
as claimed.
Of course, we cannot actually assume that A1 never makes a verification error, but we can
nevertheless obtain a zero-error algorithm for b-certification as follows. First of all, if A1 outputs
a certificate, then the certificate is guaranteed to be correct. Thus, a verification error can only
result in A1 not finding a certificate (and, possibly, going into an infinite loop while searching for
a certificate in the wrong subtree).
To handle the possibility of a verification error causing A1 to run forever, fix some sufficiently
large constant c. Run Ab on the input; if it does not halt after ck(1+klog d/
√
d)d(k+1)/2 queries (for
b = 0) or ck(1 + klog d/
√
d)dk/2 queries (for b = 1), restart A1. The probability that one or more
verifications fail during each trial is O((log2 n)/n), since the error probability of each verification is
at most 1/n2, and the total number of verifications per trial is at most the total number of queries,
which is upper bounded by O(n log2 n). Thus only the expected number of O(1) repetitions of
A1 are required before the process terminates with a correct certificate. This gives a zero-error
quantum algorithm with an expected running time given by Lemma 2, with no assumptions about
verification errors.
3 A direct sum theorem for the adversary method
We now turn to the question of lower bounds. Our approach to the lower bound for certificate
finding is based on the concept of a direct sum theorem. A direct sum theorem says that if solving
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one instance of a problem requires q queries, then solving t instances requires Ω(tq) queries. (Sev-
eral papers on quantum lower bounds—e.g., [3, 15]—have studied direct product theorems, which
are stronger statements. In particular, a strong direct product theorem says that if an algorithm
attempts to solve t instances with o(tq) queries, then it can only succeed with an exponentially
small probability. In this paper, we only need direct sum theorems.)
One of the main methods for proving lower bounds on quantum query complexity is the quantum
adversary method [2], which can be reformulated as follows [6]:
Theorem 3. Let S ⊆ {0, 1}n, and let Σ be a finite set. For any function f : S → Σ, define
ADV(f) := max
Γ
‖Γ‖
maxni=1 ‖Γ ◦Di‖
, (11)
where ‖·‖ denotes the spectral norm; Γ 6= 0 is a symmetric, entrywise non-negative |S|× |S| matrix
satisfying Γxy = 0 if f(x) = f(y); (Di)xy = 1 if xi 6= yi and (Di)xy = 0 otherwise; and ◦ denotes
the Hadamard (i.e., entrywise) product of matrices. Finally, let Qǫ(f) denote the minimum number
of quantum queries to x needed to compute f(x) with error at most ǫ. Then
Qǫ(f) ≥ 1− 2
√
ǫ(1− ǫ)
2
ADV(f). (12)
We show that the quantity ADV(f) obeys a direct sum theorem, as follows.
Theorem 4. Let S ⊆ {0, 1}n, and let Σ be a finite set. Given a function f (1) : S → Σ, let
f (t) : St → Σt be the function defined by f (t)(x) := (f (1)(x1 . . . xn), . . . , f (1)(x(t−1)n+1 . . . xtn)).
Then ADV(f (t)) = tADV(f (1)).
Proof. Let Γ(1) be an optimal adversary matrix for f (1), and let Γ(t) := Γ(1) ⊗ I⊗t−1 + I ⊗ Γ(t−1),
where I denotes the |S| × |S| identity matrix. Choosing Γ = Γ(t), the numerator of ADV(f (t)) is
‖Γ(t)‖ = t‖Γ(1)‖ (since Γ(t) is a sum of t commuting terms, each a tensor product of Γ(1) and an
identity matrix).
Now let D
(t)
i denote the |S|t × |S|t matrix with (D(t)i )xy = 1 if xi 6= yi and (D(t)i )xy = 0
otherwise. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have D(t)i = D(1)i ⊗ J⊗t−1, where J denotes the |S| × |S| matrix
with every entry equal to 1. Matrices D
(t)
i for i ∈ {n + 1, . . . , tn} can be expressed similarly by
suitable permutation of the tensor factors. Then for i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
‖Γ(t) ◦D(t)i ‖ = ‖(Γ(1) ⊗ I⊗t−1 + I ⊗ Γ(t−1)) ◦ (D(1)i ⊗ J⊗t−1)‖ (13)
= ‖(Γ(1) ◦D(1)i )⊗ I⊗t−1‖ (14)
= ‖Γ(1) ◦D(1)i ‖, (15)
where the second equality uses the fact that I ◦D(1)i is the zero matrix. By symmetry, ‖Γ(t) ◦D(t)i ‖
for general i ∈ {1, . . . , tn} only depends on the congruence class of i modulo n. It follows that
ADV(f (t)) ≥ tADV(f (1)).
Although we do not need the converse to establish a direct sum theorem, it can be proven
as follows. Using semidefinite programming duality, we can express ADV(f) as a minimization
problem; in particular [20],
ADV(f) = min
p
max
x,y∈S
f(x)6=f(y)
1∑
i:xi 6=yi
√
px(i) py(i)
, (16)
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where the minimization is over sets of probability distributions px(i), i.e.,
∑n
i=1 px(i) = 1 for all
x ∈ S. Let p(1) achieve the minimum in (16) for f = f (1). For each x ∈ St, let p(t)x be the
probability distribution obtained by selecting one of the t blocks uniformly at random and then
choosing the ith coordinate within that block according to p(1). In other words, let p
(t)
x (i) :=
1
t p
(1)
xn⌊i/n⌋+1...xn⌊i/n⌋+n(i mod n) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , tn}. To have f (t)(x) 6= f (t)(y), we must have
f (1)(xjn+1 . . . xjn+n) 6= f (1)(yjn+1 . . . yjn+n) for some j ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1}; without loss of generality,
suppose j = 1. Since the denominator of (16) is a sum of positive terms, the maximum over
x, y ∈ St is achieved by the case where xi = yi for all i ∈ {n + 1, . . . , tn}, such that there is no
contribution to the denominator from these indices. Thus, we find
ADV(f (t)) ≤ max
x,y∈S
f(1)(x)6=f(1)(y)
1∑
i:xi 6=yi
√
1
t
p
(1)
x (i)
1
t
p
(1)
y (i)
= tADV(f (1)), (17)
which completes the proof.
As a consequence of this fact, whenever a function f has an optimal adversary lower bound, it
obeys a direct sum theorem. This can be compared with the multiplicative adversary method [19],
in which a multiplicative adversary lower bound implies a strong direct product theorem.
Note that the lower bound of Theorem 4 applies to the negative adversary method as well [13],
so negative adversary lower bounds also imply direct sum theorems.
4 Lower bound
We now apply the result of the previous section to give a nearly optimal lower bound for certificate
finding.
The query complexity of certification is clearly Ω(dk/2), as knowing a certificate allows one to
evaluate the formula. (Recall that a minimal certificate for a balanced formula is a subset of inputs
all taking the same value; hence we can learn this value by evaluating one input.) This immediately
shows that the algorithm of Section 2 is close to optimal for 1-certificate finding.
It remains to prove the lower bound for 0-certificate finding. First, suppose that k is even. In
this case, a 0-certificate consists of one 0-leaf from each of dk/2 bottom subtrees, where each subtree
has size d. Suppose we are told which of the bottom subtrees we need to consider; this can only
make the problem easier. Then we must find a 0-leaf in each of these subtrees. Intuitively, the best
strategy for finding these leaves is to run Grover’s algorithm for an input of size d independently on
each of the dk/2 subtrees. To make this intuition rigorous, we can apply the direct sum theorem for
search, which says we need at least Ω(t
√
d) queries to solve t independent instances of the search
problem on inputs of size d. While we could prove this using Theorem 4, it is also implied by the
strong direct product theorem for search from [3] (which applies even to the problem of finding t
marked items with the promise that they exist). Thus, with t = dk/2, we find a lower bound of
Ω(d(k+1)/2) queries. (A similar argument works for 1-certificate finding with k odd, but we do not
need it.)
We can apply a similar approach when k is odd. Suppose we could prove a direct sum theorem
for 1-certifying two-level nand formulas—in other words, that finding 1-certificates to t independent
two-level formulas requires t times the number of queries required to certify one such formula. A
0-certificate with k odd consists of all d 1-leaves of each of d(k−1)/2 bottom subtrees. If we are told
which subtrees we must consider one level above, then we must evaluate d(k−1)/2 two-level trees.
Thus, a direct sum theorem would say that we need Ω(d(k−1)/2 · d) = Ω(d(k+1)/2) queries.
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To prove this direct sum theorem, by Theorem 4, it suffices to give an adversary lower bound
for the problem of 1-certifying a two-level nand formula. Since we are promised that the formula
evaluates to 1, at least one of its d subtrees evaluates to 0, i.e., all d inputs to that subtree are 1.
We further promise that precisely one subtree evaluates to 0, and that in all other subtrees, d− 1
of the d inputs evaluate to 1, with the remaining input evaluating to 0. These promises only make
the problem easier. Let S ⊆ {0, 1}d2 denote the set of such inputs, and let f : S → {1, . . . , d} be
defined by f(x) = i, where i is the unique index of the subtree that evaluates to 0.
We claim that ADV(f) = Ω(d). To see this, let Γ be the |S| × |S| matrix in which Γxy = 0
unless x and y differ in exactly two bits and f(x) 6= f(y), in which case Γxy = 1. In the latter case,
• the subtree which evaluates to 0 in x evaluates to 1 in y, meaning that one of its d inputs
switches from 1 in x to 0 in y, and
• exactly one of d− 1 subtrees which evaluates to 1 in x evaluates to 0 in y, meaning that its
unique 0-input in x switches to 1 in y.
Thus, for any fixed x, there are d(d − 1) possible y with f(x) 6= f(y). In other words, Γ is the
adjacency matrix of a d(d− 1)-regular graph, which means that ‖Γ‖ = d(d − 1).
Now, fixing x as well as an index i, the maximum number of ys with xi 6= yi is d: if i is an input
to the subtree evaluating to 0 in x, then we only have the freedom to choose one of d − 1 other
subtrees in which we switch a fixed input, whereas if i is an input to a subtree evaluating to 1 in
x, then we only have the freedom to choose one of d inputs to the 0-subtree to switch. This means
that Di ◦ Γ is the adjacency matrix of a graph of maximum degree d, which implies ‖Di ◦ Γ‖ ≤ d.
Overall, we have ADV(f) ≥ d− 1 = Ω(d).
Note that, more generally, a similar argument can be used to establish a direct sum theorem for
the problem of certifying k-level nand formulas. In particular, the bounded-error quantum query
complexity of certifying t independent d-regular, k-level balanced nand formulas, each of which
evaluates to b ∈ {0, 1}, is Ω(td(k+1)/2) for b = 0 and Ω(tdk/2) for b = 1.
5 Open questions
We have described a nearly optimal quantum algorithm for certifying the value of a regular, balanced
nand formula. This leaves several open questions:
• For constant-degree formulas, there is a logarithmic gap between our lower and upper bounds.
Is it possible to improve the lower bound or the algorithm (or both)?
• Since a certificate can be used to verify the value of a formula with zero error in only O(√n)
queries, our result shows in particular that the zero-error quantum query complexity of eval-
uating a d-regular, k-level balanced nand formula is O(k2d(k+1)/2). However, the best known
lower bound is Ω(dk/2), from the bounded-error case. Is there a faster quantum algorithm for
evaluating a formula with zero error that does not work by producing a certificate? (More
generally, the relationship between bounded- and zero-error quantum query complexity is
poorly understood.)
• We have restricted our attention to regular, balanced formulas. What is the quantum query
complexity of certifying an arbitrary nand formula? Of course, we can apply a similar
recursive strategy to unbalanced formulas, but in general, it is not clear how Procedure A1
should select a 0-subtree, since some subtrees may require more queries to certify than others.
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